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Should the Standards reflect the perspective that con- 
struct validity is central to all validation efforts? Is the 
construct-/con tent-/criterion-rela ted categorization of  
validity evidence now obsolete? Should the definition 
of  validity include consideration of  the consequences 
of test use? 
s most of the readers of this A journal know, the 1985 Stan- 
dards for Educational and Psycho- 
logical Testing (AERA, MA, & 
NCME, 1985) is under revision. De- 
ciding whether and how to revise the 
characterization of validity is proba- 
bly the most significant issue facing 
the authors of the revised Stan- 
dards. There is a substantial dis- 
junction between the way validity is 
characterized in the 1985 standards 
and in the published work of many 
who write about the philosophy of 
validity. While there are dominant 
themes that run throughout charac- 
terizations of validity in the Stan- 
dards and elsewhere, there are also 
substantial variations, both with re- 
spect to the boundaries of validity- 
how it is delimited from other 
concepts-and with respect to its 
components-how it is analyzed into 
aspects, constituent parts, or 
processes to guide validity research. 
The purpose of this article is to 
highlight some of the major ques- 
tions facing the measurement com- 
munity in deciding how to 
conceptualize validity in the revised 
Standards and thereby to encourage 
dialogue about how these issues 
might be resolved. Choices made 
with respect to the boundaries and 
components of validity are not just 
topics for the seminar room-they 
influence the way validity research is 
carried out, the responsibilities of as- 
sessment developers and users, and 
the rights of those who are assessed. 
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This, in turn, can influence the kinds 
of assessments that are likely to find 
favor, the cost of developing, using, 
and evaluating assessments, and the 
impact of those assessments on vari- 
ous stakeholders, including the po- 
tential differential impact associated 
with concerns about fairness and 
equity. 
The authors of the 1985 Stan- 
dards took as one of their guidelines 
that “the Standards should . . . re- 
flect the current level of consensus of 
recognized experts” (p. v.). In charac- 
terizing the themes and variations in 
the perspectives of recognized ex- 
perts, I’ve chosen to focus primarily 
on the work of scholars who have 
written about the philosophy of va- 
lidity in the context of educational 
measurement, although many of the 
issues I raise have been addressed by 
scholars writing primarily in other 
measurement contexts (e.g., Anas- 
tasi, 1986; Landy, 19861. In addition 
to the 1985 Standards, the pieces I 
draw on most heavily include the 
work of: Cronbach (1988, 19891, 
Haertel (1991, 19921, Linn (1993; 
Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 1991), Kane 
(1992), Messick (1989a, 198913,1992, 
1994a, 1994b), Shepard (1993), 
Wiley (1991; and Wiley & Haertel, in 
press). Clearly, the contributions of 
Cronbach and Messick are seminal. 
Their evolving conceptions of valid- 
ity, spanning almost half a century 
and including the state-of-the-art 
chapters on validity in the second 
(Cronbach, 1971) and third (Mes- 
sick, 1989a) editions of Educational 
Measurement, have provided the 
foundation in which other scholars 
have located their own work and 
against which alternative views of 
validity are compared. The other 
theorists whose work I cite have 
written repeatedly on the philosophy 
of validity and have proposed sub- 
stantive modifications to existing 
conceptualizations of validity Within 
the scope of this article, it is not pos- 
sible to fully present the rich per- 
spectives of these scholars or to trace 
their historical development. I have 
limited my citations to recent pieces 
that articulate these theorists’ posi- 
tions on the issues I raise. More com- 
prehensive reviews are provided by 
Angoff (1988), Messick (1989a), 
Moss (19921, and Shepard (1993). 
My intent here is to provide a 
primer, if you will, by highlighting 
major issues in validity theory and 
practice and by pointing readers to 
primary sources where these issues 
are addressed. I hope this will en- 
courage debate about these issues at 
a crucial time when the opportunity 
to effect changes in practice, through 
the revised Standards, is available. 
As readers will note, I can’t claim 
neutrality with respect to how the is- 
sues I raise are resolved. Although 
I’ve done my best to fairly present 
the range of perspectives reflected in 
the published literature, I’ve pre- 
sented my own perspective as well. 
Moreover, I make no claim to sys- 
tematically characterize assessment 
practice-the way in which the ad- 
vice from validity theorists is carried 
out, except anecdotally or by refer- 
ence to the characterization of oth- 
ers. In fact, one issue about what it 
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means for the Standards to charac- 
terize “consensus of recognized ex- 
perts” is whether this refers to those 
who write about the philosophy of 
validity or to the much broader 
group of professionals who conduct 
validity research. This is an issue to 
which I’ll return in my conclusions. 
Issues 
The questions I raise result from a 
comparative analysis of the concep- 
tualizations of validity reflected in 
the 1985 Standards and in the re- 
cent work of validity theorists writ- 
ing in the context of educational 
measurement. The first three ques- 
tions I raise essentially address is- 
sues located within the traditional 
boundaries of the concept-evaluat- 
ing the soundness of assessment- 
based interpretations-and raise 
issues about how to characterize the 
processes of conceptualizing, con- 
ducting, and reporting validity re- 
search. The second three questions 
focus on expanding the boundaries 
of validity to include consideration of 
the consequences of assessment use 
and of alternative epistemological 
perspectives for conducting validity 
research (although the answers to 
these questions will also influence 
the way in which traditional aspects 
of validity are carried out). For each 
question, I contrast the character- 
ization of validity in the 1985 
Standards with the varying charac- 
terizations in the work of those who 
write about the philosophy of valid- 
ity, noting the range of alternatives 
proposed. Where substantial consen- 
sus exists that points to a revision, I 
note the features that might be in- 
cluded in the revised Standards as 
well as the implications for the prac- 
tice of validity research; where con- 
sensus does not exist, I suggest 
additional issues that need to be re- 
solved in constructing a revision. 
Question 1: How Should Consensus 
About the Centrality of Construct 
Validity Be Characterized? 
The authors of the 1985 Standards, 
describe validity as a unitary con-cept 
requiring multiple lines of evidence- 
including, content-, construct-, and 
criterion-related evidence-to sup- 
port “the appropriateness, meaning- 
fulness, and usefulness of the specific 
inferences made from test scores” 
(p. 9). There is a close to universal 
consensus among validity theorists- 
not reflected in the 1985 Standards- 
that all validity research should be 
guided by the principles of scientific 
inquiry reflected in construct validity. 
From this perspective, content- and 
criterion-related evidence of validity 
are simply two of many types of evi- 
dence that support construct validity. 
When construct validity was first 
introduced in the 1954/1955 Stan- 
dards (see also Cronbach & Meehl, 
19551, it was viewed as an “indirect” 
method of validation to be used 
when no criterion variable or con- 
tent domain could indicate the de- 
gree to which a test measures what it 
is intended to measure. Since then, 
many validity theorists have argued 
that no criterion variable or content 
domain is ever sufficient to fully jus- 
tify an intended interpretation of a 
test score and that construct validity 
should form the basis of all validity 
research. (See Messick 1989a, 1989b, 
for an extended argument.) 
The 1985 Standards moves in this 
direction with its unitary concept of 
validity requiring multiple lines of 
evidence but stops short of the struc- 
tural reconceptualization implied in 
this perspective. The description of 
construct-related evidence, currently 
presented in the Standards as one of 
three types of evidence, provides a 
useful indicator of validity research 
within a construct validity frame- 
work. Essentially, it would require 
that validity researchers provide an 
explicit conceptual or theoretical 
framework to ground the intended 
inference and supporting evidence- 
not just for “psychological con- 
structs,” as indicated in the 1985 
Standards, but for all assessment- 
based intermetations. 
The construct of interest for a par- 
ticular test should be embedded in 
a conceptual framework, no mat- 
ter how imperfect that framework 
may be. The conceptual frame- 
work specifies the meaning of the 
construct, distinguishes it from 
other constructs, and indicates 
how measures of the construct 
should relate to other variables. 
clearly indicates the meaning of 
the test score. . . . (pp. 9-10] 
Cronbach (1988, 1989), Messick 
(1989a, 1989b), and others who build 
on their work provide more elabo- 
rate descriptions of construct valid- 
ity, suggesting features that might 
be reflected in a revision of the Stan- 
dards. The essential purpose of con- 
struct validity is to justify a 
particular interpretation of a test 
score by explaining the behavior 
which the test score summarizes. 
The proposed interpretation is the 
construct of interest. A “strong” pro- 
gram of construct validation re- 
quires an explicit conceptual 
framework, testable hypotheses de- 
duced from it, and multiple lines of 
relevant evidence to test the hy- 
potheses. Construct validation is 
most efficiently guided by the testing 
of “plausible rival hypotheses” 
which suggests credible alternative 
explanations or meanings for the 
test score that are challenged and re- 
futed by the evidence collected. 
“Convergent” evidence indicates 
that test scores are related to other 
measures of the same construct and 
to other variables that they should 
relate to as predicted by the concep- 
tual framework; “discriminant” evi- 
dence indicates that test scores are 
not unduly related to measures of 
other, distinct constructs. Prominent 
rival hypotheses or threats to con- 
struct validity include “construct un- 
derrepresentation” and “construct- 
irrelevant variance” (Messick, 
1989a, 1992). “Construct underrep- 
resentation” refers to a test that is 
too narrow in that it fails to capture 
important aspects of the construct. 
“Construct-irrelevant variance” re- 
fers to a test that is too broad in that 
it requires capabilities that are irrel- 
evant or extraneous to the proposed 
construct. Almost any information 
gathered in the process of developing 
and using an assessment is relevant 
to construct validity when it is 
evaluated against the theoretical ra- 
tionale underlying the proposed 
interpretation. Thus, validation 
“embraces all of the exDerimenta1, 
statistical, and philosophical means 
by which hypotheses and scientific 
theories are evaluated” (Messick, 
198913, p. 6). Validity conclusions are 
best presented in the form of an eval- 
uative argument (Cronbach, 1988) 
The process of compiling con- 
struct-related evidence for test va- 
lidity starts with test development 
and continues until the pattern of 
empirical relationships between 
test scores and other variables 
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that integrates the evidence pre- 
sented to justify the proposed inter- 
pretation against plausible altern- 
ative interpretations (see also Kane, 
1992; Shepard, 1993). 
Concerns have been raised that 
the “strong” program of construct 
validity places an excessive and im- 
practical burden on assessment de- 
velopers and users (e.g., Anastasi, 
1986; Cronbach, 1989; Wiley, 1991): 
Cronbach notes that “the idealized 
strong program is most appropriate 
to a scientific perspective that 
reaches centuries into the future. . . . 
Social and behavioral scientists in 
particular are obligated to help their 
contemporaries think through their 
problems and evaluate proposed so- 
lutions” (p. 163). Wiley suggests dis- 
tinguishing test validation from the 
broader concept of construct valida- 
tion. Essentially, test validation ex- 
amines the fit between the meaning 
of the test score and the measure- 
ment intent, whereas construct vali- 
dation entails the evaluation of an 
entire theoretical framework. These 
concerns do not obviate the need for 
a program of validation research 
grounded in an explicit conceptual 
framework and articulated in an in- 
tegrative argument that justifies 
(and refutes challenges to) the pro- 
posed meaning of the test score. The 
task for the authors of the revised 
Standards is to help researchers dis- 
tinguish (a) what evidence is neces- 
sary to justify the use of an 
assessment from (b) what evidence is 
part of the ongoing responsibility of 
the measurement community at 
large-evidence desirable to enhance 
theory and practice in the long run, 
but beyond what can be reasonably 
expected of a particular developer or 
user. 
If implemented in the revised 
Standards, this characterization of 
validity would not necessarily entail 
the collection of new or different 
types of evidence. It would, however, 
entail a more rigorous, integrative 
way of conceptualizing and reporting 
validity research. It might also entail 
more explicit attention to existing 
theory and research on similar as- 
sessments, which is now mentioned 
explicitly only under “validity gener- 
alization” as a fall back position 
when collection of local evidence is 
impractical. The implication for as- 
sessment developers and users is 
perhaps best captured by Cronbach’s 
(1989) criticism of test manuals 
which “rake together miscellaneous 
correlations” (p. 155) rather than 
“report incisive checks into rival hy- 
potheses, followed by an integrative 
argument” (p. 155). Within a con- 
struct validity framework, assess- 
ment developers and users would 
be expected to ground their research 
in a hypothesis generating concep- 
tual framework, evaluating multiple 
lines of evidence against the concep- 
tual framework, and presenting 
an evaluative argument to justify 
the proposed interpretation against 
plausible alternative interpretations. 
Question 2: What Alternatives Are 
There to the Construct-Content- 
Criterion Framework for Analyzing 
the Concept of Validity? 
The 1985 Standards groups the 
“means of accumulating validity evi- 
dence” (p. 9) into “convenient” cate- 
gories of construct-, content, and 
criterion-related evidence of validity, 
which are then used to organize 
much of the commentary on validity. 
These traditional categories have 
been widely criticized fe.g., Anastasi, 
1986, Cronbach, 1988; Messick, 
1989a, 198913; Shepard, 1993). When 
the concepts of content, criterion, 
and construct were initially used, 
they characterized types of validity 
associated with different types of in- 
ferences-from the test score to a 
content domain, from the test score 
to a criterion variable, or from the 
test score to a psychological con- 
struct that could not be defined by a 
content domain or a criterion vari- 
able, Since then, they have come to 
be understood as types of evidence 
supporting a unified notion of 
validity. This is reflected in the 
1985 Standards’ use of the terms 
content-, construct-, and criterion- 
related evidence rather than content, 
construct, and criterion validity or 
ualidation as they had been in previ- 
ous Standards. 
When used to categorize types of 
validity evidence within a unified 
view of validity, these traditional cat- 
egories become problematic. They 
are neither logically distinct nor of 
equal importance. While content- 
and criterion-related evidence refer 
to specific types of evidence, con- 
struct-related evidence refers to 
every other type of relevant evidence 
plus content- and criterion-related 
evidence. Moreover, when construct 
validity is viewed as the basis for all 
validity research, it makes little 
sense to use the same term as one 
category of evidence. 
While there is widespread consen- 
sus among those who write about 
the philosophy of validity on the in- 
adequacy of this framework, there 
are no obvious alternatives here, if 
obuious is understood to mean a 
framework that has been widely 
cited and used to organize validity 
inquiry. (See Moss, 1992, for an 
overview of various category 
schemes that have been used for or- 
ganizing presentations of validity) 
Messick‘s (1989a, 1989b) proposed 
alternative to the traditionai frame- 
work doesn’t help in analyzing the 
concept of construct validity; rather, 
it locates construct validity in a 
broader notion of validity that in- 
cludes explicit consideration of the 
value implications and consequences 
of assessment interpretation and 
use. Messick (1989a, 1989b, 1992, 
1994a, 1994b) has used additional, 
more refined, category schemes in 
analyzing the concept of construct 
validity. One theme that reappears 
in many characterizations of con- 
struct validity (e.g., Anastasi, 1986; 
Cronbach, 1990; Messick, 1989a, 
1989b), including the characteriza- 
tion in the 1985 Standards, lists il- 
lustrative types of evidence. Messick, 
for instance, suggests: 
We can appraise the relevance and 
representativeness of the test con- 
tent in relation to the content of 
the domain about which infer- 
ences are to be drawn,. . . examine 
relationships among responses to 
the tasks, items, or parts of the 
test-that is, the internal struc- 
ture of test responses, . . . survey 
relationships of the test scores 
with other measures and back- 
ground variables-that is, the 
test’s external structure, . . . di- 
rectly probe the ways in which in- 
dividuals cope with the items or 
tasks, in an effort to illuminate 
the processes underlying item re- 
sponse and task performance, . . . 
investigate uniformities and dif- 
ferences in these test processes and 
structures over time or across 
groups and settiiigs-that is, the 
generalizability of test interpreta- 
tion and use, . . . see if the test 
scores display appropriate varia- 
tions as a function of instructional 
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and other interventions, . . . [and, 
in the broader view of validity] ap- 
praise the value implications and 
social consequences of interpreting 
and using the test scores. (Italics 
added; 198913, p. 6) 
More recently, Messick (1994a, 
1994b) has highlighted a different 
category scheme from his chapter on 
validity (1989a). Messick’s “aspects 
of construct validity” (1994b, p. 8) 
can be mapped onto his categories of 
evidence described above; however, 
he characterizes them as “general 
validity criteria or standards” 
(199415, p. 8). 
The content aspect of construct va- 
lidity includes evidence of content 
relevance, representativeness, and 
technical quality. . . . 
The substantive aspect refers to 
theoretical rationales for the ob- 
served consistencies in test re- 
sponses, including process models 
of task performance. . . , along 
with empirical evidence that the 
theoretical processes are actually 
engaged by respondents in the as- 
sessments tasks. 
The structural aspect appraises 
the fidelity of the scoring struc- 
ture to the structure of the con- 
struct domain at issue. . . . 
The generalizability aspect exam- 
ines the extent to which score 
properties and interpretations gen- 
eralize to and across population 
groups, settings, and tasks . . . , 
including validity generalization of 
test-criterion relationships. . . . 
The external aspect includes con- 
vergent and discriminant evidence 
from multitrait-multimethod com- 
parisons . . . , as well as evidence of 
criterion relevance and applied 
utility . . . 
The consequential aspect [included 
in a broader view of validity dis- 
cussed below1 appraises the value 
implications of score interpreta- 
tion as a basis for action as well as 
the actual and potential conse- 
quences of test use, especially in 
regard to sources of invalidity re- 
lated to issues of bias, fairness, and 
distributive justice. (Italics added; 
Messick, 1994b, p. 9) 
There are a number of closely re- 
lated issues that need to be ad- 
dressed in analyzing the concept of 
validity into categories to guide va- 
lidity research, including the issue of 
whether general categories should 
be used at all. First, at what level of 
generality should categories be pre- 
sented-(a) as relevant for all valid- 
ity research, as the traditional 
categories now are; (b) for different 
purposes and types of assessment; or 
(c) only for specific cases of assess- 
ment use in specific contexts? Some 
have argued that specific cases or ex- 
emplars of validity research would 
better illustrate the concept (e.g., 
Mishler, 19901, because abstract cat- 
egories can be insensitive to context 
specific variations. At the level of 
purpose, Shepard (cited in Kane, 
1992) suggests that validity research 
proceed by articulating the assump- 
tions necessary to justify the use of a 
test for a particular purpose and by 
collecting evidence to support or 
challenge those assumptions. She 
then illustrates this with specific 
cases of validity research. These 
alternatives are not necessarily mu- 
tually exclusive-for instance, illus- 
trative categories of evidence could 
be used at the general level, followed 
by more specific categories a t  the 
level of purpose, illustrated, as Shep- 
ard has, with cases of validity 
research. 
Second, if categories are used, 
should they be perceived as examples 
of types of evidence, or should they 
be perceived as “mutually exclusive, 
exhaustive of the possible lines of 
evidence. . . , and mandatory” (Loev- 
inger, 1957, pp. 653-654)? Man- 
datory categories may not be 
responsive to particular situations 
and may constrain practice (see 
Question 6 below); illustrative cate- 
gories rely on professional judgment 
and risk encouraging an anything- 
goes mentality. The 1985 Standards 
adopts an intermediate position with 
respect to this issue, asserting that 
an ideal validation spans all three 
traditional categories but that a sin- 
gle line of solid evidence is preferable 
to numerous lines of questionable 
quality. On the other hand, consider- 
ation of each of Messick’s aspects of 
validity appears more mandatory, be- 
cause he advises that “evidence per- 
tinent to all of these aspects needs to 
be integrated into an overall validity 
judgment . . . , or else . . . compelling 
reasons [provided] why not” (1994b, 
p. 15). Third, should categories de- 
scribe types of evidence, as the 1985 
Standards do, or other aspects of va- 
lidity inquiry? For instance, others 
have proposed schemes that catego- 
rize (a) specific inferences or as- 
sumptions necessary to justify a 
proposed use (e.g., Kane, 1992; Shep- 
ard, 1993); (b) the activities under- 
taken at different stages of test 
development and use, beginning 
with a definition of the construct 
(e.g., Cole & Moss, 1989; Haertel, 
1985); or (c) the criteria by which ev- 
idence should be evaluated, such as 
cognitive complexity or content qual- 
ity (e.g., Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 
1991). (These three issues will also 
be relevant in considering how to an- 
alyze a broader conception of valid- 
ity.) 
The concern might be raised that 
to abandon such venerable and 
widely used concepts as the con- 
struct-content-criterion categories 
risks confusion. This is a concern 
that cannot be taken lightly. Shepard 
(1993) counters that the practice of 
retaining the traditional names 
while changing their meaning (from 
types of validity to types of evidence) 
has not highlighted the significance 
of the change in meaning: “Because 
existing terminology has been im- 
bued with new meanings (rather 
than inventing new terms to signify 
changed understandings), it is possi- 
ble for students of measurement to 
persist in the old forms” (p. 407). 
Certainly the transition could be 
eased with a careful mapping or 
translation of any new category la- 
bels in terms of the old. The goal 
here, as for the 1985 Standards, is to 
clearly communicate the features of 
sound validity research as well as to 
“assure that relevant issues are ad- 
dressed” (p. 2). 
Question 3: How Should the 
Relationship Between Validity and 
Other Concepts Associated With Test 
Evaluation Be Articulated? 
If almost any evidence gathered dur- 
ing the development and evaluation 
of an assessment is relevant to con- 
struct validity, then it becomes im- 
portant to articulate the relationship 
between validity and these various 
types of evidence. Here, I focus on 
the concepts of reliability, bias, and 
fairness, although the issue is rele- 
vant to other concepts addressed in 
the Standards. 
Reliability is presented in the 1985 
Standards as a concept distinct from 
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validity. Moreover, the relationship 
between reliability and validity is not 
explicitly articulated. Reliability is 
defined as freedom from errors of 
measurement and as consistency 
among measures intended as inter- 
changeable. With more complex as- 
sessments, reflecting integration of 
multiple skills and knowledge that 
may vary from task to task, distinc- 
tions between reliability and con- 
struct validity blur. This is because 
with complex assessments it be- 
comes harder to distinguish “inter- 
changeable” measures from different 
measures of the same construct 
(Moss, 1994; Wiley & Haertel, in 
press). Whether two measures 
should be treated as interchangeable 
or not is a matter of theoretical 
choice that requires logical and em- 
pirical justification-a choice which 
should be integrated into the con- 
struct validity argument. Some theo- 
rists have incorporated reliability/ 
generalizability into the concept of 
validity, including it as one of their 
analytic categories (e.g., Haertel, 
1985; Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 1991; 
Messick, 1994a, 1994b). Moreover, 
given the often noted tension be- 
tween reliability and complexity or 
authenticity with performance as- 
sessment, some have noted the im- 
portance of balancing these concerns 
in reaching and justifying an overall 
validity conclusion (Linn, Baker, & 
Dunbar, 1991; Messick, 1994a). 
Again, the rationale needs to be 
articulated in the overall validity 
argument. 
Similar concerns arise about the 
relationship between validity, bias, 
and fairness. The only mention of 
bias in the section on validity is in 
the context of differential prediction 
and criterion-related evidence. Cole 
and Moss (1989) define bias as “dif- 
ferential validity of a given interpre- 
tation of a test score for any 
definable, relevant subgroup of test 
takers” (p. 205), thus making ex- 
plicit the relevance of bias concerns 
to any kind of evidence impinging on 
the interpretation of test scores. 
While I doubt that the authors of the 
1985 Standards would disagree with 
this definition, their reference to 
bias in the chapter on validity is nar- 
row and ad hoc. With respect to fair- 
ness, the 1985 Standards carefully 
delimits concerns about validity and 
bias from concerns about the 
broader concept of fairness, which 
falls outside the guidance they pro- 
vide: “fairness is not a technical psy- 
chometric term; it is subject to 
different definitions in different so- 
cial and political circumstances” (p. 
13). How the revised Standards 
might address the relationship be- 
tween validity, evaluation of conse- 
quences, and fairness (which 
encompasses concerns about differ- 
ential interpretive validity as well as 
differential impact) is a controversial 
set of issues to which I turn next. 
Question 4: To What Extent Should 
the Standards Foreground Use Over 
Interpretation in Defining 
(Construct) Validity? 
With this question, I move beyond 
the traditional validity focus on in- 
terpretation to consider issues asso- 
ciated with the consequences of 
assessment. With Questions 4 and 5, 
I distinguish two levels at which con- 
sequences might be considered. 
Question 4 addresses expanding the 
concept of validity to include consid- 
eration of the consequences associ- 
ated with the immediate and 
expressed purposes of assessment 
(e.g., placement, selection, program 
evaluation, etc.). Question 5 focuses 
on intended and unintended conse- 
quences beyond those expressed in 
the immediate purposes of testing 
(such as, concerns about differential 
impact associated with fairness, con- 
cerns about enhancing or narrowing 
instruction, etc.). 
The 1985 Standards gives primacy 
to inferences or interpretations over 
uses in the definition of validity: ‘Va- 
lidity refers to the appropriateness, 
meaningfulness, and usefulness of 
the specific inferences made from 
test scores” (p. 9). The language of 
many of the associated standards 
reinforces this emphasis. Messick 
(1989a, 198913) highlights the impor- 
tance of investigating the validity of 
a proposed use by distinguishing use 
from interpretation in his analysis of 
validity. Construct validity, which en- 
compasses the “evidential basis of 
test interpretation,” addresses the 
soundness of an inference, without 
reference to a particular use, and 
“construct validity plus relevance/ 
utility,” which encompasses the “evi- 
dential basis of test use,” refers to 
the appropriateness of an interpreta- 
tion for a given context and use. He 
then distinguishes the evidential 
basis of test interpretation and use 
which, like the 1985 Standards, fo- 
cuses on inferences from the “conse- 
quential basis of test interpretation 
and use” which focuses on value im- 
plications and on actual and poten- 
tial outcomes. Shepard (1993) 
criticizes these distinctions between 
interpretation and use and between 
evidence and consequence, although 
not the importance of the issues they 
highlight. As she notes, the distinc- 
tions imply that construct validity 
would initially proceed in the same 
way, regardless of how a measure is 
used, merely testing additional hy- 
potheses for the applied purpose. 
This approach “would be acceptable 
if researchers had infinite resources 
to test . . . all possible theoretical and 
practical relationships” (p. 4291, but 
it does not help applied researchers 
prioritize validity questions. More- 
over, it appears to perpetuate a dis- 
tinction between facts and values 
that Messick does not intend. 
In contrast, Shepard (19931, citing 
Kane (19921, argues that construct 
validity should be guided by ques- 
tions of use: “What does the test 
claim to do?” (Shepard, 1993, 
p. 429). At the level of language, this 
point may seem subtle; however, at 
the level of practice, it may have sub- 
stantial implications for kinds of evi- 
dence required to justify the 
continued use of a test. Shepard 
(1993) argues, for instance, that 
when a test is used for placement ev- 
idence is needed about whether stu- 
dents actually benefit from the 
differential instruction; mere predic- 
tive correlations would not be suffi- 
cient. She notes that this focus on 
particular uses in guiding validity re- 
search serves a pragmatic purpose as 
well-by helping researchers set pri- 
orities in addressing validity ques- 
tions most relevant to the context of 
use. When we evaluate the use of a 
test for a given purpose, we expand 
the necessary kinds of evidence 
about how the assessment works 
within the system in which it is used 
(Cronbach, 1980). This leads into the 
broader question of the role of conse- 
quences in validity research. 
Question 5: To What Extent Should 
the Standards Incorporate the 
Investigation of Consequences Into 
Its Conceptualization of Validity? 
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Many measurement theorists have 
argued for the importance of ex- 
panding the concept of validity to in- 
clude explicit consideration of 
intended and unintended conse- 
quences of assessment use (e.g., 
Cronbach, 1988; Haertel, 1992; 
Linn, 1993; Messick, 1989a; Moss, 
1992; Shepard, 1993). The question 
about refocusing validity to fore- 
ground use is a piece of this issue. 
Here the issue is how far to expand 
the boundaries of validity andlor the 
associated responsibilities for assess- 
ment developers and users. While 
there is little dispute about the sig- 
nificance of consequences, there are 
at least three distinguishable issues 
to face in revising the Standards: (a) 
whether or not the Standards 
should encourage or require assess- 
ment developers and users to con- 
sider evidence about consequences; 
(b) to what extent the consideration 
should address actual consequences, 
thus requiring evidence about the 
outcomes of assessment use, or po- 
tential consequences, thus requiring 
careful hypothesizing and use of 
existing research; and (c) whether 
that consideration of consequences 
should be viewed as an aspect of va- 
lidity or as a distinct concept. 
In the validity chapter, the 1985 
Standards is, for the most part, 
silent on investigating consequences 
of test use, except in certain specific 
and limited circumstances. While 
one might interpret the word appro- 
priateness in the definition of valid- 
ity to cover consequences (‘Validity 
refers to the appropriateness, mean- 
ingfulness, and usefulness of the spe- 
cific inferences made from test 
scores,” p. 9), there is little in the 
specific validity standards to support 
such an interpretation. As I noted 
above, technical issues of bias are de- 
limited from the social and political 
concerns of fairness, which fall out- 
side the guidance provided. There is 
one standard in this chapter that 
refers to evidence about outcomes 
for placement purposes--“evidence 
of a test’s differential prediction for 
. . . [classification into alternative 
treatment groups] should be pro- 
vided” (p. 18)-but it is identified as 
“secondary” versus “primary” (p. 
18) implying that it is desirable, but 
not required. References to conse- 
quences do appear occasionally out- 
side the validity chapter in the 
chapters on test use. For instance, a 
primary standard for general use 
states, “Test users should be alert to 
probable unintended consequences 
of test use and should attempt to 
avoid actions that have unintended 
negative consequences” (p. 42). 
Cronbach (1988), Messick (1989a1, 
and others (e.g., Haertel, 1992; Linn, 
1993; Shepard, 1993) present a much 
more comprehensive view of the 
meaning of validity and the respon- 
sibilities of validity researchers. 
Messick defines validity as “an 
integrated evaluative judgment of 
the degree to which empirical evi- 
dence and theoretical rationales 
support the adequacy and appropri- 
ateness of inferences and actions 
based on test scores or other modes 
of assessment” (p. 131, thus building 
consideration of the value implica- 
tions and social consequences of test 
interpretation and use into his con- 
ception of validity. Cronbach (1988) 
argues that validity argument “must 
link concepts, evidence, social and 
personal consequences, and values” 
(p. 4). Haertel (1992), Linn (1993), 
and Shepard (1993) draw on this 
work in characterizing the concept of 
validity. 
A few writers have raised concerns 
about overburdening the concept of 
validity to the point where it ceases 
to provide useful guidance. Wiley, for 
instance, argued: 
A valid set of measurements-de- 
fined in terms of realized intent- 
may be badly used. . . .The under- 
standing of these use errors is 
conceptually and socially impor- 
tant, but involves social and moral 
analyses beyond the scope of test 
validation as defined here and 
would needlessly complicate the 
conception and definition of test 
validity. (1991, p. 88) 
This suggests treating the evalua- 
tion of consequences as a concept 
distinct from validity. 
Others have argued, in different 
but complementary ways, that the 
concepts are not distinct. Messick 
(1989a, 1989b), for instance, argues 
that we should expand the meaning 
of validity because the consequences 
of test interpretation and use are 
“signs of validity or invalidity” 
(1989b, p.11) and thus integrally re- 
lated to score meaning: % social con- 
sequence of testing either stems 
from a source of test invalidity or 
else reflects a valid property of the 
construct assessed, or both” (p. 10). 
Extending this approach, Shepard 
(1993) argues that unintended con- 
sequences are simply rival hypothe- 
ses to the expressed purpose of 
testing and so should be considered 
part of the validity argument: “Pur- 
suing unintended effects is a logical 
extension of [the] inclusion of rival 
hypotheses when framing validity 
evaluations” (p. 426). Cronbach 
(1988) argues that expanding the 
concept of validity appropriately ac- 
knowledges the crucial importance 
of guarding against adverse social 
consequences: “The bottom line is 
that validators have an obligation to 
review whether a practice has appro- 
priate consequences for individuals 
and institutions, and especially to 
guard against adverse consequences. 
. . . You . . . may prefer to exclude re- 
flection on consequences from the 
meanings of the word validation, but 
you cannot deny the obligation” 
(p. 6). Sometimes the expressed in- 
tent of assessment is to reform the 
system in which an assessment is 
used (Linn, 19931, and so measure- 
ment intents and anticipated conse- 
quences merge. 
The authors of the 1985 Stan- 
dards raised the concern that the 
document not become “a social ac- 
tion prescription” (p. v). This con- 
cern could be addressed by careful 
attention to another expressed goal: 
“The necessary technical informa- 
tion [should] be made available so 
that those involved in policy debate 
may be fully informed” (p. 1). To ex- 
pect that assessment developers 
and/or users will make available evi- 
dence about the potential or actual 
consequences in order to inform pol- 
icy debate is not the same as pre- 
scribing social policy-indeed, it is 
little different from requiring that 
they make available other types of 
evidence to inform judgment about 
the soundness of the interpretation. 
Moreover, no aspect of validity re- 
search is value free: as Cronbach 
(1980) notes, “the statement that a 
test producer ought to examine cer- 
tain factual questions is value-laden, 
and failure to call for investigation of 
certain others is in itself taking sides 
on political matters” (p. 105). 
There is a real and legitimate con- 
cern about the cost of requiring as- 
sessment developers andlor users to 
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provide additional evidence and of 
possibly delaying or precluding the 
operational use of a potentially ben- 
eficial assessment. However, not to 
consider such evidence risks either 
unrealized intentions or unintended 
negative consequences (Haertel, 
1992; Linn, 1993). Haertel, for in- 
stance, advises: 
The consequences of performance 
measurement. . . merit continual 
attention. The expected benefits 
. . . may or may not materialize, 
and negative side effects may or 
may not occur. For instance, stu- 
dent performance testing may en- 
courage better instructional 
approaches . . . or may lead to an 
undesirable narrowing of the cur- 
riculum. . . . New testing formats 
may bring diminution in racial, 
ethnic, or gender group differ- 
ences, or may exaggerate those 
differences. (p. 988) 
Again, this issue might be resolved 
by providing sound and practical ad- 
vice that helps developers and users 
distinguish (a) what evidence is nec- 
essary before the first operational 
use of an assessment from (b) what 
evidence is necessary to justify its 
continued use and from (c) what evi- 
dence is the ongoing responsibility of 
the measurement community at 
large. 
Here, as with categories of evi- 
dence for construct validity, it might 
be appropriate to distinguish be- 
tween advice provided at the general 
level-for all purposes of assess- 
ment-and advice provided at the 
level of particular purposes. Messick 
(1989a), Cronbach (1988,1989), and 
Shepard (1993) offer general advice 
for evaluating the intended and un- 
intended consequences of a test in- 
terpretation and use. To evaluate the 
potential consequences of a test use, 
Messick suggests pitting the pro- 
posed use against alternative assess- 
ment techniques and alternative 
means of serving the same purpose, 
including the generalized alternative 
of not assessing at all. Cronbach 
(1988, 1989) articulates distinctions 
among functional, political, and eco- 
nomic consequences of assessment. 
He suggests using stakeholders’ in- 
terests as well as evaluators’ con- 
cerns to generate a list of potential 
questions and then prioritizing the 
questions based on (a) prior uncer- 
tainty about the issue, (b) informa- 
tion to be yielded by a feasible study 
compared to how much uncertainty 
will remain, (c) cost of the investiga- 
tion in terms of time and dollars, and 
(d) leverage for achieving consensus 
about the use of the test in the rele- 
vant audience. Shepard (1993) sug- 
gests using the intended purposes of 
assessment to generate rival hy- 
potheses about unintended conse- 
quences and then prioritizing 
questions in light of the seriousness 
of consequences for individuals and 
programs. 
For many purposes of assessment, 
there is a history of accumulated re- 
search into consequences of particu- 
lar concern (e.g., about the impact of 
high-stakes assessment on teaching 
or learning [Linn, 1993; Linn, Baker, 
& Dunbar, 19911, about the impact 
of different selection models on vari- 
ous groups of concern [e.g., Cole & 
Moss, 19891, etch The authors of the 
Standards might draw on the accu- 
mulated experience of research tra- 
dition with various purposes to 
suggest important categories of con- 
sequential evidence to consider with 
respect to those different purposes. 
At the very least, assessment devel- 
opers might be expected to address 
potential consequences by summa- 
rizing the existing evidence of using 
the assessments like the one in ques- 
tion for the proposed purpose and 
context. And, when an anticipated 
consequence of assessment is explicit 
in the purpose of assessment (e.g., to 
raise educational standards) or when 
the anticipated consequences “im- 
pinge on the rights and life chances 
of individuals” (Cronbach, 1988, 
p. 6) (e.g., to certify for high school 
graduation), the investigation of con- 
sequences becomes particularly 
salient. 
Question 6: Should the Standards 
Incorporate Principles From 
Research Traditions Other Than 
Psychometrics in  Characterizing 
Validity to Support the Evaluation 
of Less Standardized Assessments ? 
Given the goal of the Standards to 
characterize existing consensus 
among measurement experts, the 
answer to this question is “no:” Few 
measurement theorists have ad- 
dressed the issue explicitly. However, 
the issue cannot be ignored. There 
are already assessment practices in 
use for high-stakes purposes that do 
not (perhaps cannot) yield the type 
of evidence expected in mainstream 
approaches to validity research. Con- 
sider, for instance, the practice of 
some schools where certification for 
graduation is like a dissertation 
exam. Students, in negotiation with 
teachers, prepare one or more ex- 
hibits of their work, and a committee 
meets to debate and evaluate the 
merits of that work (e.g., Darling- 
Hammond & Snyder, 1992). This 
purpose of certification for gradua- 
tion falls within the purview of the 
Standards, but this format does not. 
Evidence of reliabilityigeneralizabil- 
ity across readers and tasks-at 
least in the way these concepts are 
typically operationalized-is not ob- 
tainable because the tasks are not 
evaluated independently. In fact, to 
require such evidence would sub- 
stantially alter the nature of the as- 
sessment and, some would argue, 
decrease its validity. Moss (1994) and 
others (e.g., Johnston, 1989) have 
suggested using validity principles 
from interpretive research traditions 
to assist in evaluating these and 
other less standardized assessment 
practices, thereby exploring alterna- 
tive means for serving the important 
epistemological and ethical purposes 
that underlie traditional validity 
practices. 
Among members of the psycho- 
metric community, Messick opened 
the door here with his (1989a) dis- 
cussion of a “Singerian” mode of in- 
quiry: He suggests observing or 
evaluating one inquiring system in 
terms of another to probe the 
methodological and value assump- 
tions underlying each system. Draw- 
ing on this advice, Moss (1994) 
suggests contrasting psychometric 
and interpretive (especially herme- 
neutic) approaches for drawing and 
evaluating assessment-based inter- 
pretations to highlight assumptions 
and consequences to teachers and 
students of using more standardized 
forms of assessment. 
This is an issue that will require 
careful consideration. As the above 
example illustrates, current validity 
theory discourages such practices by 
requiring evidence that may not be 
possible to provide. Should the Stan- 
dards continue to require evidence 
that discourages these develop- 
ments? Should the Standards ven- 
ture into relatively uncharted 
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territory and attempt to provide 
guidance for investigating the valid- 
ity of such nonstandardized assess- 
ments (guidance which may fall well 
outside the accepted principles of 
psychometrics)? Should the Stan- 
dards delimit its applicability to ac- 
knowledge that certain purposes for 
assessment may be served by assess- 
ment formats that are not them- 
selves covered by the Standards? If 
this strategy is adopted, does it open 
the door for assessment developers 
and users to argue that their assess- 
ments, too, fall outside the formats 
covered, thus weakening the ability 
of the Standards to encourage sound 
professional practice? There are no 
easy answers. 
Concluding Comments 
The disjunctions in validity theory 
that I’ve summarized, between the 
1985 Standards and the work of 
many measurement scholars, al- 
ready existed when the 1985 Stan- 
dards was published. In fact, much 
the same article could have been 
written over a decade ago, with 
minor changes in dates and names 
(and without the question on alter- 
native epistemological perspectives, 
which was not prominent in the dis- 
course among members of the mea- 
surement community). By 1980, 
there was already an emerging con- 
sensus among validity theorists 
about the inadequacy of the con- 
struct-content-criterion framework 
for guiding validity research, about 
the centrality of construct validity to 
the evaluation of any assessment- 
based interpretation, and about the 
importance of expanding the concept 
of validity to include explicit consid- 
eration of the consequences of as- 
sessment use. (For reviews, see 
Angoff, 1988; Messick, 1989a; Moss, 
1992; Shepard, 1993.) 
In characterizing expert consen- 
sus, the choice to focus on validity 
theorists rather than on the larger 
group of professionals who develop, 
use, and evaluate assessments is a 
controversial one. Cronbach (1988), 
Messick (1989a1, and Shepard (1993) 
all comment on the gap between cur- 
rent validity theory and the practice 
of much validity research. If the con- 
sensus reflected in the revised Stan- 
dards is faithful to the practice of 
validity research, then revisions are 
likely to be far less extensive. This 
would be, I believe, a mistake. The 
fact is that the Standards not only 
reflect consensus, they shape it- 
both directly, in the practices they 
promote (and discourage), and, indi- 
rectly, through textbooks used in ed- 
ucating assessment professionals. 
Although, as Messick (1989a) notes, 
it is not an inappropriate role for 
professional standards to codify 
sound practice, “the price paid in the 
politics of compromise is that the 
standards downplay principles that 
would lead the measurement field 
forward-that is, the formulation of 
desirable, though challenging, next 
steps toward improved testing prac- 
tice” (p. 92). If the revised Standards 
reflects largely the practices that the 
existing Standards shapes, then it is 
hard to imagine how the inertia of 
tradition will be overcome. 
Toulmin (1972), a historian and 
philosopher of science, comments on 
possibilities for engagmg in rational 
conceptual change within a disci- 
pline. He suggests that the task of 
choosing among alternative concep- 
tual frameworks amounts to making 
a prediction, a “rational bet” (p. 4871, 
about which set of concepts will bet- 
ter fulfill the long-term ambitions of 
the discipline involved. The rational- 
ity of that prediction is based on an 
appraisal of past experience with con- 
ceptual changes in terms of their suc- 
cess in furthering the goals of the 
discipline and their substantive rele- 
vance to the current situation, 
This is useful advice. There is 
much we can learn from our past ex- 
perience with various assessment 
practices and the principles by which 
they have been evaluated. Consider, 
for instance, what we have learned 
about the role that multiple-choice 
tests can play when used for high- 
stakes purposes, in narrowing the 
curriculum, and possibly resulting in 
differential access to opportunities 
to learn for students in low scoring 
schools (Linn, 1993). Such tests were 
in operational use, with associated 
rewards and sanctions, long before 
systematic evidence was available 
about their consequences for teach- 
ing and learning. What might we 
have done differently if providing ev- 
idence about consequences had been 
considered a necessary part of sound 
professional practice? Linn raises 
the concern that the nation is about 
to embark on another test-based re- 
form, now with high optimism about 
the beneficial effects of performance 
assessment, but again without ade- 
quate quality control to evaluate the 
soundness of those assumptions, 
What can we learn from our past ex- 
perience to better inform these cru- 
cial policy decisions? 
I hope members of NCME will par- 
ticipate actively in the dialogue sur- 
rounding the revision of the 
Standards. Comments for the joint 
committee revising the Standards 
can be sent to Dan Eignor, NCME’s 
liaison to the committee, at Educa- 
tional Testing Service, Princeton, 
NJ, 08541. The revision of the Stan- 
dards provides a rare-once per 
decade-opportunity for us to recon- 
sider the guiding principles of our 
profession at a time when we can 
make changes that have a substan- 
tial, positive impact on the practice 
of validity research and on the com- 
munity of stakeholders we serve. 
Let’s take advantage of it. 
Note 
I am grateful to Lorrie Shepard for her 
detailed and thoughtful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article, to members 
of the Joint Committee on the Stan- 
dards for Educational and Psychological 
Testing who continually inform and 
challenge my perspective on these is- 
sues, and to the National Academy of 
EducationlSpencer Post-Doctoral Fel- 
lowship Program for providing me with 
the time to complete this work. The 
views expressed in this article are my 
own; they are not intended to represent 
the views of the joint committee or any 
of its members. 
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